Descartes’ Baby and Natural Dualism

Andre, Shane (2022) Descartes’ Baby and Natural Dualism. Open Journal of Philosophy, 12 (02). pp. 214-232. ISSN 2163-9434

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Abstract

The clash between science and the doctrine of the soul is not dead, as Yale psychologist Paul Bloom demonstrates in his fascinating study, Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human. New research on babies’ “looking time” suggests that they view the world in terms of two kinds of things—“bodies and souls”. They are “natural dualists”, not because of religion or philosophy, but because of babies’ disposition to observe differences in the way objects and people behave. Nevertheless, Bloom observes that natural dualism is out of step with modern science. Does this mean that babies start life with a skewed view of reality? Not necessarily, I argue. While babies see people as souls, there is no evidence whatever that they see them as souls separate from their bodies. In my paper, I discuss and critique the highlights of Bloom’s position, point out some of the pitfalls in philosophical arguments for natural dualism, and propose a defense of the soul as a secular, not just a religious, concept. As Bloom suggests, naturalists do not need to feel embarrassed to refer to the human soul.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Open STM Article > Social Sciences and Humanities
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email support@openstmarticle.com
Date Deposited: 30 Jun 2023 05:33
Last Modified: 17 May 2024 10:41
URI: http://asian.openbookpublished.com/id/eprint/1227

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